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To many judges, doing independent research
when confronted with new and unfamiliar material seems the most responsible
and natural thing to do. To others, it represents the worst kind of overreaching
and a threat to long-cherished adversarial values.
active role in policing the flow of scientific and other
experttoday
evidence
into the
courtroom.
Most to
famously,
udges
are under
increasing
pressure
take an
1
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharnaceuticals,
the Supreme
Court tasked federal judges as all-important gatekeepers
who are obligated to ensure that expert testimony is both
relevant and reliable. Many state courts have subsequently followed suit, whether by adopting Daubert
explicitly or by more stringently enforcing their own scientific admissibility standards.
The dilemma for judges is that they are not necessarily
well-versed in the specialized fields over which they act as
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gatekeepers. Indeed, even among the scientifically
inclined, gatekeeping can prove extremely challenging
because the sheer breadth of modern knowledge precludes any one judge from being familiar with everything.

Many thanks to Simcha Rivkin for research assistance, and the Project on
Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy and the Brooklyn Dean's Summer
Research Fund for generous support.
This article is an abridged version of an article forthcoming in the February 2007 issue of the Duke Law Journaltitled "Independent Judicial Research
in the Datibert Age." A draft of the complete article that includes all footnotes and acknowledgments is available from the author's homepage at
www.edwardcheng.com.
1.50) IS. 579 (1993).
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Faced with an important question
in an unfamiliar and specialized
field, responsible people often do
research: they read reference books,
scan journal articles, even search the
Internet. May judges do the same
when confronted with a complicated
issue of scientific admissibility? But
perhaps more importantly, should
they? The answer is strikingly controversial. A survey of state appellate
judges and a study of current statutes
and case law show significant disagreement and ambiguity on the
issue. In addition, as the latter sections of this article and the judicial
reactions that follow it suggest, the
desirability of independent research
may depend significantly on a
judge's vision of the legal system.

Appellate judges survey
To ascertain judicial attitudes on
independent research, surveys were
distributed to a group of 136 state
appellate judges attending a law and
science conference. In order to meas-
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25 percent found it to be "very undesirable." Respondents were similarly
divided on the issue of reading medical treatises, as seen in Figure 2.
Only a few methods showed consensus among judges, and these all
involved what are traditionally classified as ex parte communications. A
resounding 89 percent of judges
responded that informally consulting a family physician was "very
undesirable," and 88 percent agreed
that informally consulting a medical
school professor was to some degree
undesirable. Strong judicial norms,
developed through ethics rules
against ex parte communications,
likely played a key role in generating
uniform answers in these categories.
The results carry the usual caveats
that accompany surveys as well as a
few additional ones. Selection effects
are a particular concern here
because of the response rate and the
original conference sample itself.
Respondents may have had more
favorable views toward judicial

urejudicial attitudes, rather than controlling law, the survey asked participants to disregard any specific rules in
their jurisdiction. Survey participants
were given a scenario under which a
judge faced a difficult scientific
admissibility issue in a pharmaceutical products liability case. They were
then presented with a variety of methods by which the hypothetical judge
could obtain additional, independent
information on the drug to inform
his or her admissibility decision. The
survey asked the judges to rate the
desirability of each practice using a
scale of 1 (very undesirable) to 5 (very
desirable). The response rate was
approximately 60 percent.
Survey results showed judges
divided
on most independent
research methods. For example, as
seen in Figure 1, on the question
whether it is desirable for a judge to
"[fli] nd and read medical journal articles (peer-reviewed) on the drug," 21
percent of respondents found the
research to be "very desirable," while

Figure 1: Survey results on judges reading medical journals
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Figure 2: Survey results on judges reading medical treatises
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research, because they had already
demonstrated some interest in participating in judicial education and
academic research. Conversely, ethical surveys may generally have a tendency to skew toward perceived
ethical responses, since respondents
may feel that they have more to lose
in appearing unethical than overly
cautious. Nevertheless, although
these biases may have influenced the
precise percentages observed, they
arguably did not affect the overall
conclusion that there is deep conflict
on these issues within the judiciary.
Finally, it is possible that judges
ignored the survey instructions and
were influenced by rules from their
specific jurisdictions. This problem is
diminished, however, because as discussed below, few jurisdictions have
definitive rules governing independent research, and no statistically significant relationship was found
between ajudge's state and his or her
responses.

Current legal regime
One might expect that there would be
clear and well-established rules governing independent research, but
unfortunately there are not. Few cases
have explicitly addressed the issue,
60
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and those that have are largely
divided. A number of cases have
approved of independent research,
either explicitly or implicitly by engaging in it.2 Other courts have found the
use of extra-record treatises anathema.' Indeed, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals recently displayed
the tension in stark relief. In her concurrence to Hernandez v. State,' Presiding Judge Sharon Keller wrote that
the "appellate courts should never
conduct their own independent
research of the scientific literature,"
while Judge Michael Keasler in dissent
argued that the court should be permitted to look at "any reliable authority it could locate" regardless of
whether it was presented on the
record. (Judges Keasler and Keller
elaborate on their views below.)
At the same time, the evidentiary
rules and the canons of judicial
ethics offer little guidance to judges.
Federal Rule of Evidence 201, which
governs judicial notice, suggests that
judges may conduct independent
research of legislative facts. However,
whether scientific knowledge constitutes legislative fact is unclear. Like
legislative facts, scientific facts are
often generally applicable and noncase-specific. However, in the scien-
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tific admissibility context, scientific
facts are not used to determine or
interpret legal rules.
Similarly, the ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, adopted in some
form in an overwhelming majority of
states, clearly bars ex parte communications. Unfortunately, however,
the ex parte prohibitions only
obliquely address the issue of library
research, because their focus is
arguably on informal communications that lack a citable or publicly
available record.

A proposal
The primary reason to allow independent research is largely self-evi-

2. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 780 F.2d 902
(lth Cir. 1986); Samuels v. Mladineo, 608 So. 2d
1170 (Miss. 1992) (en banc). Under Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), many jurisdictions permitted (or still permit) independent
research. E.g., State v. Gore, 21 P.3d 262, 304
(Wash. 2001); State v. Garcia, 3 P.3d 999, 1003
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Harvey, 699 A.2d 596,
619 (NJ. 1997); People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d
721, 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). However, under Frye,
the independent research is directed at determining "general acceptance" or the existence of a consensus, not the actual validity of the scientific
technique. See People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d 721, 738
(Ill. 1996) (McMorrow, J., concurring).
3. E.g., Prestige Homes, Inc. v. Legouffe, 658
P.2d 850 (Colo. 1983) (en banc); In reJ., 365 A.2d
521 (Vt. 1976).
4. 116 S.W.3d 26 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2003).

dent. Independent research would
allowjudges to obtain specific and relevant information that would help
inform and guide their scientific
admissibility decisions. In many ways,
independent research is a natural
extension of the recent trend toward
judicial education programs in science. Those programs are built on
the premise that ifjudges learn more
about scientific principles and methods, they can more comfortably and
competently handle scientific admissibility questions. The problem with
judicial education programs is that
they necessarily suffer the limitations
of being broad in scope and separated in time. Independent research
enables judges to refresh their memories and plug gaps in their knowledge.
Why then do some judges so
adamantly oppose independent
research? One major objection is
that it does violence to the adversary
system by requiring an active judicial
role and undermining the importance of party-presented evidence.
Another major fear is that judges will
lack the wherewithal to conduct firstrate library research and may be
duped into using outlier or discredited scientific materials.
These concerns, while valid, do
not justify an absolute prohibition
on the practice. First, there are reasons to sacrifice adversarial values in
the scientific evidence context. The
adversary system is particularly illsuited at handling specialized knowledge, largely because the parties'
ability to prescreen and compensate
expert witnesses virtually ensures
conflicting and partisan testimony.
At the same time, scientific facts are
general truths not confined to the
immediate parties. Scientific admissibility decisions therefore exert
considerable influence over future
cases, and erroneous decisions can
be readily exposed by third parties,
detracting from the legitimacy of
the system. Second, the structural
context of litigation guides any
potential independent research,
reducing the possibility of a judge
reaching outlandish results. Independent research supplements,
rather than replaces, the parties'

presentation of evidence, so the parties always frame the debate. In addition, because judges must write
reasoned opinions, they are naturally inclined toward standard, reliable sources anyway, because the use
of fringe sources risks undermining
their persuasive power.
Nevertheless, the objections raised
by opponents do advocate for several
procedural safeguards to independent research that would promote
greater accuracy and maintain many
of the benefits of adversarial testing.
One safeguard would be to restrict
independent research only to sources
that are citable and publicly available.
Another is that judges should cabin
their inquiry to generally applicable
scientific information such as scientific principles and methods or the
accuracy of a scientific technique.
Finally, as generations of commentators have argued in the legislative fact
context, when judges discover information critical to the decision-making
process, the parties should be notified
and given an opportunity to respond,
enabling the parties to double-check
the judge.
The future
Can independent research become a
successful tool for judges facing difficult scientific admissibility decisions?
Prognostication is always a perilous
endeavor, but there are some grounds
for optimism. Looking at the survey
data, one would expect that if independent research were made explicitly permissible, significant numbers
ofjudges would engage in it. Over 40
percent of judges are already positively disposed. That said, the survey
data also suggest that a sizable number of judges will resist, even if given

explicit authorization. These judges
are uncomfortable with or plainly
oppose that kind of active judicial
role.
This predicted state of affairs of
course raises a more fundamental
problem of consistency. The rule of
law, after all, suggests that whether a
judge engages in independent
research should depend on some predetermined rule, not personal preference. But to the extent that the

situation is unavoidable, there is reason to believe thatjudge-to-judge variation is less concerning in the
independent research context. In
particular, independent research is
not a substantive rule of law, and the
decision to engage in it does not have
any clear implications on outcome.
The usual concern about inconsistency-the unfairness associated with
having outcomes depend on judge
identity-is thus attenuated.

Judges are deeply divided about the
issue of independent research, which
goes to the heart of their roles and
responsibilities in the legal system. To
many judges, doing independent
research when confronted with new
and unfamiliar material seems the
most responsible and natural thing to
do. To others, it represents the worst
kind of overreaching and a threat to
long-cherished adversarial values. But
whether one supports the practice or
not, one thing is clear. The issue of
independent research deserves far
greater attention than it has so far
from jurists, academics, and practitioners alike. w,
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